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STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC REVENUES
1.   Optimum level and structure 
of public revenues : a few 
considerations
1.1  Level
From the point of view of economic growth, public rev-
enue and expenditure have opposing effects.
Taxes and social security contributions exert a predomi-
nantly negative inﬂ  uence on overall economic results, in 
that they interfere with market mechanisms and decisions 
on employment, investment, consumption and savings, 
and curb business initiative.
On the other hand, some public spending (on infrastructure, 
education, research and development, for example) increases 
the productivity of the economy and is therefore essential to 
the achievement of satisfactory economic growth. However, 
there is less of a consensus on the favourable effect on 
growth of the other spending (mainly social transfers)  : 
some people consider that this effect exists, while others 
take the view that it does not, and that such spending tends 
to be motivated by social and political objectives (such as fair 
distribution of income, a peaceful society, welfare). Finally, 
it is obvious that interest charges can be regarded as non-
productive expenditure, since they make no contribution at 
all to the determinants of economic growth (such as the 
deployment of labour and capital, efﬁ  ciency, technological 
progress and standards of education).
Structure of public revenues
On the basis of these considerations, it is generally 
acknowledged that if public spending remains below 
a certain level and essentially takes the form of clearly 
productive expenditure, its beneﬁ   cial effects offset the 
adverse impact of taxation. Beyond a certain level, the 
strictly economic beneﬁ   ts of further government inter-
vention are smaller, more uncertain or more debatable, 
so that there is less unanimity to state that the ben-
eﬁ  ts outweigh the drawbacks of higher taxes. Similarly, 
empirical research sheds no clear light on a possible link 
between the level of the public budget and the strength 






















































CHART 1  FISCAL AND PARAFISCAL LEVIES







Johan Claeys  (1)
(1)  The authors would like to thank G. Langenus for his contribution.48
Be that as it may, within the European Union  (1) there are 
wide variations in the burden of ﬁ  scal and paraﬁ  scal levies, 
ranging from over 50 p.c. of GDP in Sweden to around 
35 p.c. of GDP in the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal, and even less than 30 p.c. of GDP in Ireland. 
With a ﬁ  gure of 46.6 p.c., Belgium is among the group of 
countries where the burden of ﬁ  scal and paraﬁ  scal levies 
is clearly above the average for the EU (40.9 p.c.).
1.2  Structure
Leaving aside issues concerning the optimum size of the 
public sector, one might wonder in what way a given 
desirable level of public spending can best be ﬁ  nanced, 
how the necessary levies should be distributed over 
labour, consumption, capital or other tax bases, or in 
other words, what is the public revenue structure that has 
the least adverse impact on growth. Just as there is no 
consensus on the optimum size of the public sector, so 
there is debate over the optimum composition of public 
revenues. Without attempting to give an exhaustive 
account, we can mention the following guidelines.
First, it seems appropriate to distribute the burden of taxa-
tion as evenly as possible over the various tax bases, as the 
loss of efﬁ  ciency in the allocation of resources caused by 
the disruption of market mechanisms is more than pro-
portionate to the rate of tax.
Next, a tax system which encourages growth must mini-
mise the disincentive to use the available factors of produc-
tion. For example, where the labour supply is concerned, 
there must be sufﬁ  cient  ﬁ   nancial incentives for working 
(employment rate), for doing more work (e.g. full-time 
rather than part-time), and for working more intensively 
and productively (e.g. by in-service training). These ﬁ  nancial 
incentives will be all the greater if the worker keeps, in net 
terms, a larger share of the fruits of his additional labour (or 
increased productivity), i.e. if the marginal rates are lower. 
In this connection, it is also necessary to take account of the 
amount and duration of replacement beneﬁ  ts, as these can 
create unemployment traps.
Furthermore, the government’s freedom of action in 
levying taxes is often limited by the great mobility of 
certain tax bases. This primarily concerns business activity, 
incomes from movable property and – to an increasing 
extent – skilled labour. Individually, the government of a 
country often cannot tax these sources at the desirable 
level (e.g. according to the said need for a balanced dis-
tribution of the tax burden), owing to the risk that these 
tax bases may be transferred to economies where the tax 
burden will be lower. In that context, there appears to be 
a need for some international coordination or harmonisa-
tion of tax systems.
Finally, it is clear that shifts in the composition of public 
revenues generally have both advantages and disadvan-
tages which need to be assessed, and the end result may 
depend very much on the reactions of the economic 
agents.
Thus, a shift from taxes on labour to taxes on consump-
tion, for example, should encourage employment, as 
taxes on labour may depress supply and demand on the 
labour market, whereas a tax on consumption does not, 
in principle, affect the employment content of produc-
tion, and is borne not only by those in work but by the 
population as a whole. Moreover, labour taxes concern 
only national production, whereas consumption taxes 
affect both home-produced goods and imports.
These advantages of a shift from taxes on labour to taxes 
on consumption are entirely valid only in a theoretical 
world where, apart from the altered composition of 
public revenues, everything else remains unchanged. In 
reality, that is never the case, and tax changes very often 
trigger reactions and indirect effects which are at odds 
with the expected positive effect, and may even negate 
it altogether.
The effect of a shift in taxation was demonstrated empiri-
cally in a recent Working Paper  (2) published by the Bank.
That study simulates the effect of a linear 5 p.c. reduction  (3) 
in the implicit rate of employers’ contributions, offset by an 
increase in the VAT rate. The scale of this measure is such 
that its inﬂ  uence can be simulated by means of an econo-
metric model based on observations of periods when such 
changes took place. For Belgium, such a simulation gives 
an increase in employment (after 4 years) of 8,500 units, as 
the reduction in social security contributions lowers the cost 
of labour both in relation to capital and in comparison with 
other countries. In an open economy, this positive effect 
outweighs the negative inﬂ   uence of the contraction in 
domestic demand caused by the loss of purchasing power 
of individuals (following the rise in consumer prices caused 
by the higher rate of VAT)  (4).
(1)  For statistical reasons, only the Member States prior to May 2004.
(2)  K. Burggraeve and Ph. Du Caju (March 2003), “The labour market and 
ﬁ  scal impact of labour tax reductions”, Working Paper, National Bank of 
Belgium – Research, No. 36.
(3)  Applied to the current rate, this corresponds to a reduction of 
around 1.3 percentage points.
(4)  This simulation is based on the assumption that the reduction in charges is linear, 
i.e., the same for all levels of pay. If the reduction in charges is granted to certain 
categories, such as the low-skilled, it may have a considerably greater positive 
impact on employment. (P. Stockman (December 2001), “General and selective 
wage cost reduction policies in a model with heterogeneous labour”, Federal 
Planning Bureau, Working papers).49
STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC REVENUES
However, that favourable impact of a shift in taxation 
diminishes or even disappears in the event of reactions 
and indirect effects.
a.   If the rise in consumer prices prompts a corresponding 
increase in gross wages – which happens automatically 
in the case of indexation – part of the initial advantage 
will be lost and the rise in employment shown by the 
simulation exercise will be only 3,300 units (after four 
years).
b.   Furthermore, if – on the occasion of wage bargain-
ing – the reduction in labour costs (resulting from the 
cut in employers’ contributions) is used to ﬁ  nance real 
wage increases, so that labour costs ultimately exceed 
their pre-reform level, there would actually be job 
losses totalling 6,100.
It is therefore clear that a shift in the burden of taxes (and 
paraﬁ  scal charges) from labour to consumption is beneﬁ  -
cial only in so far as these secondary effects are limited. 
The best conditions for success exist where the consumer 
price increases resulting from higher taxes on consump-
tion do not give rise directly to wage indexation,  (1) and 
the reduction in employers’ contributions does not lead 
to real wage increases.
A shift in taxation is therefore no panacea. It can only 
have a substantial impact on employment and growth if 
there is proper consultation between the government and 
the social partners.
In the event of a major shift from labour taxes to con-
sumption taxes, it is also necessary to take account of 
the fact that consumption taxes generally exert a much 
more direct effect on inﬂ  ation than labour taxes, and that 
they increase income inequality. The highest incomes are 
in fact relatively less affected, since the average rate of 
consumption declines as income increases. However, this 
last objection is not insurmountable since the unwelcome 
effects of a rise in indirect taxation on the distribution 
of incomes can, possibly, be reduced or cancelled out by 
compensatory measures in respect of personal income tax 
and/or social security. Moreover, the regressive nature of 
consumption taxes can be attenuated in two ways  : by 
higher rates on luxury goods (e.g. the road fund tax, 
which increases sharply with the power of the vehicle) 
and by charging lower rates on essential commodities 
(such as food).
2.   International comparison of the 
structure of taxation
The following comparison is based mainly on recent 
studies conducted by the European Commission  (2), in 
which the various types of tax are expressed as a percent-
age of the tax base according to the national accounts 
approach.
In the EU, the implicit tax rate on labour is, on average, 
far greater than that on consumption, at 37 p.c. against 
20.4  p.c.  ; this situation prevails in all Member States 
except Ireland. In relation to the European average, how-
ever, each country places different emphasis on one form 
of taxation or the other  : one group, consisting of the 
Scandinavian countries, features a high level of taxation 
on both sources, in contrast to Spain which has relatively 
low rates of tax in both cases. In other countries, the bias 
(1)  In Belgium, this applies to products which are excluded from the health index, 
namely tobacco, alcoholic beverages, benzine and diesel.






























































CHART 2  IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON VARIOUS TAX BASES
  (Percentages of the tax base, 2001, unless otherwise stated)
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in favour of one form of taxation is more marked : in Italy, 
labour is subject to above-average rates of tax, while taxes 
on consumption are relatively low  ; on the other hand, in 
Ireland and the Netherlands, taxation is concentrated to a 
relatively greater degree on consumption. Finally, Belgium 
and France are in an intermediate position  : taxes on 
labour are considerably higher than the average, whereas 
the burden of taxes on consumer spending is close to the 
European average.
In Belgium, however, taxes on labour incomes have been 
falling since 2001, following the decline in personal 
income tax and social security contributions, and it was 
recently decided to increase certain indirect taxes. The 
burden of taxation has therefore shifted slightly towards 
consumption, and the concentration of the burden on 
labour has been somewhat tempered.
With the exception of Ireland, where the ﬁ  gure was only 
12.5 p.c. in 2003, the nominal rate of corporation tax in 
most countries is fairly concentrated around the average 
level of 35 p.c., 2 points below the implicit rate of tax 
on labour. There is some correlation between the level 
of these two rates, except in the Scandinavian countries 
which, while imposing substantially higher labour taxes 
than the European average, have nominal rates of corpo-
ration tax which are decidedly lower than elsewhere.
3.  Taxes on labour incomes
3.1  Macro-economic implicit rate
In 2001, the latest year for which data are available, the 
implicit tax rate on wages  (1)  –  calculated by the European 
Commission on the basis of the national accounts – was 
6.8 percentage points above the EU average in Belgium, 
practically equalling the level in France and Finland, 
around 5 percentage points lower than in Sweden, but 
higher than the ﬁ  gure recorded in other countries, often 
to a very substantial degree  (2).
As already stated, levies on labour incomes in Belgium 
have declined since 2001 as a result of the cuts in per-
sonal income tax and social security contributions.
3.2   Micro-economic approach : average rates and 
marginal rates
To gain a fuller picture of the levies on labour incomes, it 
is worthwhile supplementing the analysis based on macro-
economic data with an examination based on microeco-
nomic data collected by the OECD  (3). This second source 
calculates the average and marginal rates for various 
levels of income.
The picture is comparable to that seen at aggregate level, 
in that Belgium practically always has the highest average 
rate for an unmarried employee with no children, even in 
the case of the lowest incomes. The rate is in fact already 
close to 50 p.c. for an income equal to two-thirds of the 
average production worker’s wages, and the difference in 
relation to the European average is 11 percentage points. 
All countries have progressive systems, since the average 
rate increases everywhere with income. Belgium has a 
relatively steeper progression, as the difference in relation 
to the European average widens : at the level of the aver-
age wage it is over 12 percentage points, rising to almost 
14 points once gross pay totals 167 p.c. of the average 
production worker’s wages.
The countries with a high average rate often also have high 
marginal rates. That is particularly true in Belgium where, 
whatever the level of income, they are always the highest 
for any EU country, already exceeding 65 p.c. in the case 
of low and average incomes and reaching 70 p.c. for high 
incomes. The difference in relation to the European aver-
age ranges between 14 and 20 percentage points.
(1)  The implicit tax rate on wages is deﬁ  ned as all charges levied on incomes from 
paid employment and paid over to the government (taxes and actual social 
security contributions paid by employers and employees) divided by the wage bill.
(2)  The relatively low level of this rate in the Netherlands is due to the fact that some 
of the social security contributions are paid to entities which are not included in 
the general government sector.























































CHART 3  IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON WAGES
  (Percentages, 2001)
Source : EC.
EU average51
STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC REVENUES
The level of these marginal rates of ﬁ  scal and paraﬁ  scal 
levies depends on the marginal rates of personal income 
tax (plus additional levies, such as regional and local taxes, 
if any) and the rates of social security contributions. For 
the latter, many countries have an income ceiling above 
which the levy (or part of it) becomes zero. That is not the 
case in Belgium, placing the country at a disadvantage in 
regard to high incomes.
3.3  Structure of the levies on labour incomes
As already mentioned in 3.1, the macroeconomic data 
reveal that Belgium has a high implicit tax rate on income 
from employment, and that undeniably has an adverse 
impact on economic growth since it depresses supply and 



























































































CHART 4  AVERAGE RATES OF FISCAL AND PARAFISCAL 
LEVIES ON LABOUR FOR AN UNMARRIED 
EMPLOYEE WITH NO CHILDREN




FOR AN INCOME EQUAL TO THE AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION WORKER’S INCOME
FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF INCOME, 
EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF 
THE AVERAGE PRODUCTION WORKER’S INCOME

































































































CHART 5  MARGINAL RATES OF FISCAL AND PARAFISCAL 
LEVIES ON LABOUR FOR AN UNMARRIED 
EMPLOYEE WITH NO CHILDREN
  (Percentages of labour costs, 2002)
Source : OECD.
(1)  These are the rates applicable to the highest income bracket, for which the 
threshold varies from one country to another.
Belgium
EU average
FOR AN INCOME EQUAL TO THE AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION WORKER’S INCOME
FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF INCOME, 




67 p.c. 100 p.c. 167 p.c.52
Apart from the level of the implicit burden, the composi-
tion or structure of the burden is probably also of great 
signiﬁ  cance here. The level of the implicit tax rate can be 
regarded as resulting partly from the level of the marginal 
rates applicable to the various income brackets and partly 
from all the other determinants, such as tax expenditure 
– e.g. for the acquisition and renovation of property, 
long-term savings or for family reasons – the level of 
the tax-free allowance and the allowance for business 
expenses.
From the point of view of economic growth, the level of 
the marginal rates undoubtedly plays a key role  : these 
rates in fact determine the net advantage for taxpayers 
in performing additional work. As shown in 3.2, around 
two-thirds of an increase in wages costs in Belgium was 
absorbed by ﬁ  scal and paraﬁ  scal levies, whatever the level 
of personal income.
As already stated, the difference between Belgium and 
the EU average is larger for the marginal rates than for 
the implicit rates. That suggests that the inﬂ  uence of tax 
expenditure and other variables is more favourable to 
taxpayers in Belgium than elsewhere. Such a structure for 
the burden of ﬁ  scal and paraﬁ  scal levies  –  high marginal 
rates partly attenuated by other tax variables – is prob-
ably not ideal from the point of view of economic growth 
and employment.
There are no harmonised statistics permitting direct 
international comparison of the scale and content of tax 
expenditure.
In Belgium’s case, there are no speciﬁ  c data on tax expend-
iture relating to labour incomes either. However, the High 
Council of Finance (HCF) has compiled ﬁ  gures indicating 
the impact of tax expenditure on all personal incomes. 
These show that, in 1999, tax expenditure reduced rev-
enues by almost 1.6 billion euro, or 5.9 p.c. of the yield 
from personal income tax.
The largest tax expenditure relates to property incomes ; it 
covers the allowances for life insurance related to housing 
and allowances for the repayment of capital on mortgage 
loans, plus the additional allowance for mortgage inter-
est. This expenditure costs the budget over 900 million 
euro, and its inﬂ  uence is decisive  : according to the HCF, 
microeconomic calculations show that the effective rate 
of tax on an investment in a person’s own home totalled 
less than 7 p.c., whereas the rate on a risk-free long-term 
investment came to almost 20 p.c.  (1). All these incentives 
are intended to encourage individuals to own their home 
and thus to support the building and renovation sector, 
encouraging growth and employment.
In second place comes tax expenditure relating to long-
term ﬁ  nancial savings, namely the allowances granted for 
the second and especially the third pillar of the pension 
system. In 1999 this caused a loss of revenue estimated at 
556 million euro  (2). It fulﬁ  ls a number of purposes, such as 
encouraging long-term savings and compensating for the 
high marginal rates. However, it is questionable whether 
these tax concessions have any signiﬁ  cant effect on the 
aggregate savings level or whether their main effect is 
to encourage portfolio reallocation. Moreover, this tax 
expenditure is concentrated mainly on the highest income 
brackets where households already have a high savings 
rate on average  (3).
The other types of tax expenditure cover various minor 
measures, though some of them are directly relevant 
to a policy of supporting growth via employment since 
they promote either demand for labour, by reducing the 
cost of labour (Local Employment Agency vouchers), or 
the supply of labour by encouraging the participation of 
women (child care costs).
(1)  HCF (2002), “Avis sur les déductions à l’impôt des personnes physiques”/”Advies 
over de aftrekken bij de personenbelasting”.
(2) This  ﬁ  gure overestimates the budget cost since it takes no account of the taxes 
due at the end of the long-term savings contract.
(3)  C. Valenduc, (July-August 1999), “Les effets de répartition de la non-imposition 
des revenus de l’épargne”, Bulletin de Documentation, Ministry of Finance.
TABLE 1 TAX EXPENDITURE (PERSONAL INCOME TAX) 
IN BELGIUM
(Estimated loss of revenue, millions of euro, 1999)
Source: HCF.
Measures relating to property incomes  . . . . . . . . 912
Life insurance linked to housing and mortgage 
capital   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Additional allowances for mortgage interest . . 106
Measures relating to long-term savings   . . . . . . . 556
Life insurance   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Pension savings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Group insurance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Other (Local Employment Agency, child care 
costs, etc.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,586
p.m. Total as p.c. of personal income tax 
revenues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.953
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4.  Tax on consumption
International data concerning the tax burden on con-
sumption are usually based on the ratio between the 
proceeds from consumption taxes and the tax base, gen-
erally conﬁ  ned to domestic consumption expenditure of 
households. The implicit rate thus obtained overestimates 
the real tax burden, since consumption taxes are normally 
also levied on other tax bases such as intermediate con-
sumption and investment in ﬁ  xed assets by general gov-
ernment, and investment in housing.
According to data published by the EC, there are wide vari-
ations in taxes on consumption between Member States. 
Consumption is most heavily taxed in the Scandinavian 
countries and in Ireland, whereas the tax burden is lowest 
in Italy and Spain. Belgium’s position is very close to the 
EU average. In all Member States, VAT is the main tax 
on consumption. It is therefore treated separately here, 
before the other taxes on consumption.
4.1  VAT
VAT rates in the EU Member States are subject to 
European regulations. The aim is to combat harmful 
tax competition while keeping taxes on certain products 
at a low level, for economic or social reasons, i.e. to 
compensate to some extent for the regressive nature of 
the consumption tax or to encourage the consumption 
of these products. The EU has set a minimum rate of 
15 p.c. as the standard rate of VAT. One or two reduced 
rates of 5  p.c. minimum are also available for certain 
goods and services, an option used by all Member States 
except Denmark. In addition, reduced rates are permitted 
in certain speciﬁ  c regions of a few Member States, and 
super-reduced rates or zero rates (e.g. on newspapers 
and periodicals, and – in Ireland and the United Kingdom 
– also on certain basic products such as food and medi-
cines) which were in force before 1 January 1991 are still 
applied. Finally, reduced rates are also allowed provision-
ally for a number of labour-intensive services which are 









































CHART 6  IMPLICIT TAX RATE ON PRIVATE CONSUMPTION (1)
  (Percentages, 2001)
Source : EC.
(1)  Consumption taxes as percentages of household consumption expenditure.
VAT
Other
EU average : VAT
EU average : total
TABLE 2 MAIN RATES OF VAT IN THE EU MEMBER STATES
(Percentages, end 2003)
Source: EC.
Standard rate Rate applicable 
to food
Denmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25.0 25.0
Sweden  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25.0 12.0
Finland   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22.0 17.0
Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21.0 6.0
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21.0 0.0
Italy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20.0 4.0
Austria   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20.0 10.0
France  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19.6 5.5
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19.0 6.0
Portugal   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19.0 5.0
Greece   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18.0 8.0
United Kingdom  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17.5 0.0
Germany  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16.0 7.0
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16.0 4.0
Luxembourg   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15.0 3.0
EU  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18.5 5.4
Difference BE – EU  . . . . . . . . . . . .  +2.5 +0.654
In Belgium, the implicit rate of VAT is 1.4 percentage 
points above the EU average. That is because of the 
standard rate of VAT which, at 21 p.c., was 2.5 percent-
age points above the EU average at the end of 2003. 
Conversely, in the case of the rate applicable to food, 
which is a major consumption item, the difference was 
just 0.6 percentage point. It is possible that, apart from 
the level of the nominal rates, other factors may explain 
the level of the implicit tax burden, estimated on the basis 
of the national accounts. For instance, the structure of 
private consumption or the size of the tax bases other 
than private consumption may vary from one Member 
State to another. Finally, the extent of tax evasion may 
be greater in one Member State than another. However, 
these   factors are difﬁ  cult to quantify.
4.2  Other taxes on consumption
In contrast to the implicit VAT rate, the implicit rate of 
other consumption taxes is slightly lower in Belgium than 
the EU average, namely by 0.3  percentage point. The 
main taxes in this category are excise duty and speciﬁ  c 
taxes on the purchase of motor vehicles.
Excise duties are levied mainly on mineral oils, tobacco 
products and alcoholic beverages. As in the case of VAT, 
the EU has set minimum rates for these taxes, either per 
unit of output (speciﬁ  c excise duty) or as a percentage of 
the purchase price (ad valorem duty).
TABLE 3 RATES OF EXCISE DUTY AND TAXES ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS
(End 2003, except for mineral oils: March 2004)
Source: EC.
(1) Calculated as all indirect taxes other than VAT, including taxes similar to excise duties.
(2) Euro per thousand litres.
(3) Euro per thousand cigarettes.
(4) Euro per degree Plato per hectolitre.
(5) Euro per hectolitre.
(6) Taxes (other than VAT) as a percentage of the price (before tax) of a typical vehicle with a cylinder capacity of 2001 cc.
(7) For a beer 11 degrees Plato.
(8) The minimum duty is 18 euro per 1000 litres, but Belgium and Luxembourg are exempt provided that they charge a “monitor charge” of at least 5 euro per 1000 litres on 
heating oil.
(9) Either 60 euro per 1000 cigarettes and 57 p.c. of the retail price, or 95 euro per 1000 cigarettes.
Taxes (other than VAT) on mineral oils (1) Duty
on cigarettes (3)
Duty on alcohol Taxes
(other than VAT) 
on the purchase 
of a car (6) Eurosuper 95 (2) Diesel (2) Heating oil (2) Beer (4) Non-sparkling
wine (5)
United Kingdom  . . . . . . . . . 703.6 703.6 63.0 233.4 7.8 252.8 0.0
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664.5 380.8 202.9 86.6 1.7 (7) 59.0 33.0
Germany  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 654.6 470.5 61.3 102.5 0.8 0.0 0.0
Finland   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597.3 346.8 71.5 115.2 11.4 235.5 56.0
France  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589.2 416.9 56.6 141.2 1.0 3.4 0.0
Italy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558.6 403.2 403.2 59.9 1.4 0.0 2.0
Denmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546.5 369.3 282.0 108.7 3.3 (7) 94.9 173.0
Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536.2 321.8 18.5 95.8 1.7 47.1 2.0
Portugal   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522.6 308.3 89.6 64.8 1.1 (7) 0.0 49.0
Sweden  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519.6 361.3 361.2 102.7 6.5 242.4 0.0
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442.7 368.0 52.1 189.4 7.9 273.0 51.0
Luxembourg   . . . . . . . . . . . . 442.1 252.8 9.9 66.2 0.8 0.0 0.0
Austria   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424.7 310.1 106.1 84.4 2.1 0.0 14.0
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399.2 296.4 111.1 56.6 0.8 0.0 12.0
Greece   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301.4 250.0 24.8 71.9 1.1 0.0 88.0
EU  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593.4 418.8 96.6 120.5 2.7 64.1 10.5
Difference BE – EU 
(percentages)  . . . . . . . . . . –9.6 –23.2 –80.9 –20.5 –43.3 –26.5 –81.0
p.m. Minimum duty   . . . . . . 287.0 245.0 18/5 (8) 60/95 (9) 0.7 0.055
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In comparison with other EU Member States, excise 
duties and similar taxes are on the low side in Belgium. 
The duties on petrol, diesel, cigarettes and alcoholic bev-
erages are well below the average. The difference is very 
substantial in the case of heating oil, taxes other than VAT 
(namely the 5 euro monitor charge and the energy con-
tribution of 13.4854 euro per 1000 litres) being negligible 
in Belgium compared to the EU average, at little more 
than the minimum rates for the EU.
The ranking of the Member States on the basis of excise 
duties varies greatly from one product category to another. 
However, it is noticeable that the United Kingdom charges 
very high duty on motor vehicle fuel, tobacco and alcohol, 
with only heating oil being taxed at a relatively modest 
rate. Conversely, in Luxembourg, excise duties on all the 
product categories considered are among the lowest in 
the EU. Apart from the United Kingdom, Germany also 
charges high rates of duty on motor vehicle fuel, whereas 
these rates are the lowest in Greece. Heating oil is par-
ticularly heavily taxed in Italy  : consumption taxes (other 
than VAT) on this source of energy are four times higher 
than the average, and more than 20 times higher than 
the rates in Belgium. In regard to cigarettes, duties are 
clearly the highest in the English-speaking countries while 
they are lowest in the southern European countries and 
Luxembourg. Finally, beer and wine are subject to particu-
larly heavy rates of duty in the English-speaking countries 
and in Scandinavia.
Motor vehicles are a speciﬁ  c source of consumption taxes. 
VAT is charged on purchase, and VAT and excise duty 
must be paid on the fuel, but in many Member States the 
purchase, possession and/or use of motor vehicles are also 
subject to additional consumption taxes.
Looking at taxes (other than VAT) on the purchase of a 
car, the rate applicable to a typical vehicle is 173 p.c. of 
the price (excluding tax) in Denmark. Taking account of 
the 25 p.c. VAT, the total tax on the purchase of a vehicle 
thus corresponds to practically double the price exclusive 
of taxes  (1). Other countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Sweden and Luxembourg do not levy any 
special tax – apart from VAT – on the purchase of a car. The 
opposite applies in Belgium, where there is a registration 
tax, but this is well below the European average for a typical 
vehicle, and corresponds to only a fraction of the price.
5.  Tax on corporate proﬁ  ts
The effective tax rate on corporate proﬁ  ts is determined by 
the implicit rate of corporation tax, i.e. the tax due in pro-
portion to the company’s proﬁ  ts. That rate is inﬂ  uenced not 
only by the nominal rate but also by various tax allowances 
and special rules which make the “tax results” deviate from 
the economic results, as well as various preferential schemes. 
A recent study  (2) conﬁ  rms that foreign direct investment is 
inﬂ  uenced more by this implicit rate than by the nominal 
rate. However, there is a possibility that the nominal rate 
may fulﬁ  l an important signalling function, and that high 
nominal rates – even if they are counterbalanced by sub-
stantial allowances or preferential schemes – are liable to 
discourage potential investors. The nominal rates in force 
in the EU Member States are therefore examined here ﬁ  rst, 
before the analysis of the implicit rates.
5.1 N ominal rate
The cut in the nominal rate of tax in Belgium on 1 January 
2003 is in line with the downward trend recorded for 
several years now in many European countries. In 2002 
it was still the highest rate in the EU, but it is now, at 
33.99 p.c.  (3), roughly 1  percentage point below the EU 
average. Most countries deviate little from this average, 
with the particular exception of Ireland – where the 
(1)  However, these taxes are not all borne by the consumer, as the price (excluding 
taxes) is particularly low in Denmark.
(2)  S. Ederveen and R. de Mooij (2003), “To which tax rate does investment 
respond ? A synthesis of empirical research on taxation and foreign direct 
investment”, Banca d’Italia, Research Department, Public Finance Workshop on 
Tax Policy.















































CHART 7  NOMINAL RATES (1) OF CORPORATION TAX




(1)  Including additional levies, such as regional and local taxes, if any.
(2)  Disregarding the one-off rate increase of 1.5 percentage points in 2003 (as a 
contribution towards the costs of the flooding).
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rate was just 12.5 p.c. – and the Scandinavian countries 
which, like Belgium, have a high overall burden of ﬁ  scal 
and paraﬁ  scal levies, but which have opted to keep the 
nominal rates of corporation tax at a relatively low level.
5.2 I mplicit rate
There are two different ways of calculating the implicit rate. 
One is to use the historical statistics on taxes and business 
proﬁ  ts (“backward looking” approach). The other is to 
determine the tax burden by assessing a speciﬁ  c invest-
ment decision in the light of the rules and parameters of 
the current legislation on companies (“forward looking” 
approach).
The results of empirical studies  (1)  adopting the ﬁ  rst 
approach are fairly similar, despite major methodological 
differences. In the majority of countries, the implicit rate 
is well below the nominal rate owing to tax allowances 
and preferential schemes. However, in the late 1990s 
– the latest period for which ﬁ  gures are available  – this 
difference was greater for Belgium than for the EU as a 
whole. This suggests that, for companies in general, the 
favourable impact of the tax allowances and/or preferen-
tial schemes was greater in Belgium than on average in 
the other Member States.
Empirical studies  (2) based on the other approach make it 
possible to reﬁ  ne these conclusions, as they reveal that the 
difference between the implicit rate and the nominal rate 
applicable to “ordinary” companies  –  not covered by any 
preferential scheme – differs little from the EU average 
in Belgium. The difference reported above between the 
nominal rate and the implicit rate for companies in gen-
eral, which is above average in Belgium, therefore appears 
to be attributable purely to the nature and scale of the 
preferential tax schemes.
Preferential schemes for speciﬁ  c branches of activity exist 
in some countries, particularly for service centres, distribu-
tion and shipping. However, the most noteworthy meas-
ures concern the ﬁ  nancial transactions of multinational 
groups. According to the OECD  (3) there are no speciﬁ  c 
provisions on this within the EU, except in Belgium (coor-
































































































IMPLICIT RATES APPLICABLE TO “ORDINARY” 
COMPANIES (WITHOUT PREFERENTIAL RATES) (2001)
IMPLICIT RATES BASED ON NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
(Averages for the period 1998-2000)
(1)  Cf. for example EC (2003), “Structures of the taxation systems in the European 
Union” and G. Nicodème (2001), “Computing effective corporate tax rates : 
comparison and results”, European Economy – economic papers, 153.
(2)  Cf. for example EC (2001), “Company taxation in the internal market”, 
Commission staff working paper.
(3)  OECD (2004), “The OECD project on harmful tax practices : the 2004 progress 
report”.
(4)  A. Hespel and M. Mignolet (2000), “Tax aided ﬁ  nancial services companies and 
the cost of capital”, Fiscal studies.
and certain regions of Italy and Spain. An empirical study 
by Hespel and Mignolet  (4) shows that the tax advantage of 
these schemes can be particularly signiﬁ  cant  : the return 
required on a foreign investment falls from 5.9 p.c. for an 
investment in a company not covered by any preferential 
scheme to 3.5 p.c. under the Dutch preferential scheme, 
and actually drops to around 1.25 p.c. in the case of a 
Belgian coordination centre or a Luxembourg ﬁ  nancial 
company eligible for a preferential scheme.57
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Box  –  Tax treatment of research and development
The research and development effort is generally regarded as a key determinant of the economy’s growth 
potential. However, the free operation of market forces often results in too low a level of this type of expenditure, 
since businesses base their investment decisions only on their private return, whereas such expenditure generally 
has substantial external beneﬁ  ts. The government can boost such investment in various ways. It can engage in 
research activities itself, use regulation (e.g. patent rights) to protect the advantages for the innovating business, 
or provide ﬁ  nancial encouragement for such private investment via a speciﬁ  cally targeted policy of subsidies or tax 
concessions. The tax aspect is discussed in this box.
In many countries, the system of taxing companies incorporates speciﬁ  c incentives for research and development. 
These consist mainly of favourable rules on depreciation, whereby payment of tax is deferred, and tax allowances 
permitting part of the expenditure on research and development to be deducted from the basis of assessment 
(tax expenditure) or from the tax due (tax credit). Sometimes, this tax expenditure or tax credit concerns only 
expenditure on machinery or buildings ; in general, however, the system is much more generous and, apart from 
the normal allowance for labour costs, an additional tax allowance also applies in respect of expenditure on 
labour costs relating to research. The allowance is calculated as a percentage of the level of, or the increase in, 
expenditure on research and development.
In Belgium, corporation tax essentially encourages research and development via three speciﬁ  c tax concessions  (1). 
First, the enhanced investment allowance concerns assets used for this purpose. It is possible to opt for the single 
allowance (13.5 p.c. in 2003) or the staggered allowance (20.5 p.c. in 2003). However, the enhanced investment 
allowance is generally modest in comparison with that in other countries  : the percentage deduction from the 
basis of assessment (and not from the tax due) is relatively small, and the scheme does not apply to labour costs. 
Second, machinery and equipment used for research and development can be depreciated at 33.33 p.c. per 
annum, a more favourable rate than the standard depreciation allowed by the tax authorities. Finally, businesses 
taking on an additional full-time worker for scientiﬁ  c research or to develop the technological potential of the 
business qualify for an annual allowance on their taxable proﬁ  ts of 11,800 euro (or even 23,600 euro for a highly 
skilled researcher).
An OECD study  (2) summarises the effect of tax concessions in a synthetic indicator, which measures the scale of 
the tax incentives for research and development. This is the B index, which shows, for an investment of 1 USD in 
research and development, the pre-tax return required in order not to sustain any loss after tax. The lower this B 
index (or, as in the chart, the higher 1 – B) the greater the tax incentives in the tax system in question.
In the case of Belgium, the OECD study takes account of the ﬁ  rst two concessions only, and leaves aside the 
allowance for the recruitment of additional personnel. The research and development incentives provided in the 
case of corporation tax are therefore slightly under-estimated in the synthetic indicator for Belgium.
!
(1)  Apart from the corporation tax provisions, a new measure came into force on 1 October 2003 concerning personal income tax, in order to encourage scientiﬁ  c 
research in colleges and universities. These institutions have to pass on to the State only 50 p.c. of the withholding tax on earned income, to be deducted at source 
from the pay of researchers, the rest remaining at their disposal. Researchers are entitled to state the whole of the withholding tax in their tax return, so that their 
net income remains unchanged. Thus, the Treasury levies less tax on individuals while the research institutions have more funds at their disposal. On 1 July 2004 this 
measure will be extended to the researchers of 72 scientiﬁ  c institutions, and in January 2005 to the researchers of private enterprises collaborating with one of those 
institutions.
(2)  OECD (2002), “Tax incentives for research and development : trends and issues”.58
On the basis of this indicator, Belgium – together with Finland, Sweden, Greece, Germany and Italy – is clearly 
among the EU countries with the smallest tax incentives during the period considered. Of all those countries, 
Belgium is the only one to offer a speciﬁ   c allowance for investment in research and development, but as 
pointed out above, this allowance is relatively meagre. The characteristic of countries in the intermediate group 
–  Austria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and Denmark – is that this speciﬁ  c investment allowance 
is considerably larger (and also relates to labour costs, for example), high rates apply (sometimes over 100 p.c.) 
and the amounts can be deducted from the tax due (instead of from the basis of assessment). Finally, Spain and 
Portugal have the most favourable schemes.
6.  Capital tax
The compilation of internationally comparable ﬁ  gures for 
the tax burden on capital and capital incomes is hampered 
by a number of methodological problems. For instance, 
taxes on incomes from movable and immovable assets are 
not collected solely via speciﬁ  c levies (such as the with-
holding taxes on income from movable and immovable 
assets) the yield from which is known precisely, but in a 
good many cases this income (or part of it) is added to 
other income so that it is statistically difﬁ  cult for the tax 
on this income from movable and immovable assets to be 
separated from that due on other incomes. Furthermore, 
mortgage loans and long-term savings often give rise to 
large reductions in personal income tax. However, there 
are few if any international statistics available on the scale 
of this tax expenditure, which should, in principle, be 
deducted from the tax on capital.
The European Commission study already mentioned,  (1) in 
which all taxes are related to labour, consumption or capi-
tal, attempts to ﬁ  nd a solution to these methodological 
problems, partly on the basis of conﬁ  dential information 
obtained from the national tax authorities : the tax burden 
on capital is calculated as the taxes on capital (and capital 
income) in relation to capital incomes. However, the ﬁ  g-
ures obtained must always be interpreted with caution, 









































THE TAX TREATMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(1 – B-index (1))
Source : OECD.
(1)  The B index measures, for an investment of 1 USD in research and development, 
the return required before tax in order not to sustain any loss after tax.
Average
(1)  EC (2003), “Structures of the taxation systems in the European Union”.59
STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC REVENUES
That study was based on a very broad deﬁ  nition of taxes. 
It includes corporation tax, taxes and social security contri-
butions paid by the self-employed  (1), inheritance tax, gift 
tax, taxes on immovable property  (2), taxes on transactions 
in movable and immovable property  (3), taxes on interest 
and dividends received by individuals less capital forma-
tion allowances in personal income tax, and taxes on the 
net assets of individuals. During the year to which the 
study relates, only Luxembourg, Sweden, France, Spain 
and Finland levied such a tax. The yield on this form of 
tax is usually minimal because of the low rates and the 
exemptions for modest amounts of wealth or for certain 
types of assets.
According to this study, which is based on ﬁ  gures relat-
ing to 2001, capital is most heavily taxed in France, 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, whereas the tax 
treatment of capital is particularly generous in Greece. In 
Belgium, the implicit tax rate on capital (28.7 p.c.) is close 
to the average for EU Member States (29.8 p.c.).
7.  Conclusions
Analysis of the structure of public revenues reveals that 
labour incomes are taxed relatively heavily in Belgium. 
In 2001, the latest year for which data are available at 
European level, the implicit burden of ﬁ  scal and paraﬁ  scal 
levies on labour was 6.8 percentage points above the EU 
average. On the other hand, the rates levied on consump-
tion, corporate proﬁ  ts and income from capital are much 
closer to the European average.
In Belgium, the reductions in personal income tax and 
social security contributions already implemented or 
scheduled have reduced the levies on labour incomes 
in recent years, and that reduction will continue in the 
future. Conversely, certain indirect taxes such as the 
duty on tobacco and motor vehicle fuels, where the 
rates applied in Belgium are below the EU average, have 
increased and further rises are planned for the years 
ahead. Following the entry into force of these measures, 
the burden of ﬁ  scal  and  paraﬁ   scal levies will diminish, 
and shift slightly towards consumption, correcting to 
some extent the heavy concentration of this burden on 
labour. This will bring the structure of taxation closer to 
that for the EU.
The reduction in taxes on earned incomes, which is most 
marked in the case of low incomes, should have a favour-
able impact on employment, though only if it does not 
indirectly trigger an increase in wages. Application of the 
European directive guaranteeing the effective taxation of 
incomes from savings in the form of interest payments, 
together with the efforts to limit preferential schemes 
concerning corporation tax, may offer ways of redirecting 
public revenues in favour of employment.
(1)  Self-employed persons’ incomes have two components : remuneration for the 
work done and remuneration for the capital employed. Since the available 
statistical information does not permit a breakdown between the two 
components, the European Commission decided to consider all income and all 
levies relating to self-employed persons as incomes from capital and taxes on 
those incomes.
(2)  In Belgium, these taxes are levied in the form of the withholding tax on incomes 
from immovable property, but also via personal income tax.
(3)  In Belgium, these are registration fees, mortgage and registry charges, the tax on 








































CHART 9  IMPLICIT RATE OF TAX ON CAPITAL (1)
  (Percentages, 2001 (2))
Source : EC.
(1)  Tax on capital (and on capital incomes) as a percentage of income from capital.
(2)  For 2001, data relating to the implicit tax rate on capital were not available for 
Sweden (34.5 p.c. in 2000) and Portugal (30.7 p.c. in 1999).
(3)  The rate mentioned for Germany is depressed by the change in the legislation on 
distributed earnings of companies, which led to substantial one-off refunds of 
corporation tax in 2001.
EU average